A. The fragmentation of international law
The recognition that international law is made up of fragments of normative and institutional activity is not new. Notwithstanding the ambitious hopes represented by the United Nations system, there has never been a single global legislature or appellate court to mould a unified body of international law. Nor has there ever been a uniform will for such a system by sovereign states. Instead, states have implicitly or explicitly conceived of particular issues and problems -often at key historical moments of transition and often strategically -and responded by agreeing to new laws and supporting international organisations. So besides the wealth of laws stemming from treaties agreed under the auspices of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, there are additional branches of international trade law, human rights law, investment law and so on. And unlike the rapid increase in regulatory frameworks and agencies within domestic states -which has also happened at key moments of strategic and ideological change -there has been no hierarchical order to resolve normative and institutional conflicts. In recent times, this expansion of international treaties and associated international organisations and tribunals has generated a burgeoning interest in the effects of fragmentation: what it means and whether something ought to be done about it.
At the turn of the century, the International Law Commission of the United Nations (ILC) directed its attention to the fragmentation phenomenon, and later convened a 'Study Group' of ILC members. The ILC Study Group, chaired by Martti Koskenniemi, released a consolidated study into 'The Fragmentation of International Law' in 2006, 1 followed by Introduction 3 a set of conclusions by way of 'practical guidelines to help thinking about and dealing with the issue of fragmentation in legal practice'. 2 Its terms of reference were to focus on situations where multiple international norms co-existed in relationships of interpretation or conflict. 3 This focus augmented existing literature that has been preoccupied with the potential that conflicting norms could lead to disarray and disorder within the international legal system. 4 Amongst that literature are calls for unity and coherence.
The ILC Study Group's findings, although underpinned by a systemic understanding of international law, are modest, contextual and heterogenous. Its recommendations aim to be 'concrete' and 'practiceoriented'. 5 For example, the Study Group discusses the rule of lex specialis derogat legi generali, which is based on the primacy of the specific over the general, and observes that a more specific treaty will usually trump the general treaty. 6 The Study Group also discusses the principle of lex posterior derogat legi priori, which gives primacy to a more recent treaty over an earlier one, 7 and a 'principle of harmonization', according to which international norms are interpreted 'so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations'. 8 The Study Group points to peremptory norms, norms 'accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a whole from which no derogation is permitted', 9 such as the prohibition of slavery or genocide, and emphasises that such norms will trump all others in an event of conflict. 10 Special treaty clauses that set out the priority of Young 4
conflicting norms, such as the provision in the United Nations Charter for Charter obligations to prevail over members' obligations under any other international agreement, are also supported. 11 The offered techniques are non-exhaustive, flexible, and not always in harmony themselves, given the possibility, for example, that the application of a lex specialis and lex posterior principle to actual or potential conflicts of norms could lead to different results.
The recommendations of the ILC Study Group were offered without regard to the institutional dimension of fragmentation. That the Study Group's mandate expressly excluded an analysis of the relations between various international institutions is understandable, given the ILC's position within the United Nations system, which may have precluded any substantive recommendations about institutional practices or hierarchical relations between international organisations. Notwithstanding the restricted nature of its mandate, however, the Study Group was wellaware of the growth in 'quasi-autonomous normative sources' arising at the international level, 12 and of the complexity associated with nongovernmental participants and other actors. 13 Indeed, it concludes its pioneering study by calling for further work to be done on 'the notion and operation of "regimes"'.
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B. A typology of 'regimes'
'Regimes' is a short-hand, non-legal term that has multiple and overlapping meanings in diverse literatures, including public international law and international relations (IR). These meanings are often qualified with adjectives such as 'self-contained' or 'special', as described in the following typology.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) used the term 'self-contained regimes' to describe the rules of diplomatic law, in order to emphasise that the consequences of breach were contained within the prescriptive content of the primary rules. 15 Although the ILC once drew upon this 11 Such priority was based on UN Charter Art. 103 and the special character of the UN: see ibid., Conclusion (36) 'misleading doctrine', it was subsequently abandoned. 16 The ILC Study Group concludes that the term was a misnomer, and cautions against its use, although it concedes that groups of rules and principles concerned with a particular subject matter could be labelled as 'special regimes'.
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The concept of 'special regimes' was useful for the ILC Study Group in conceptualising the operation of lex specialis. The Study Group identifies three possible understandings of the term:
where] violation of a particular group of (primary) rules is accompanied by a special set of (secondary) rules concerning breach and reactions to breach [ie the diplomatic law as conceived by the ICJ in Tehran]; (ii) [more broadly, where there is] a set of special rules, including rights and obligations, relating to a special subject matter. Such rules may concern a geographical area (eg a treaty on the protection of a particular river) or some substantive matter (eg a treaty on the regulation of the uses of a particular weapon). Such a special regime may emerge on the basis of a single treaty, several treaties, or treaty and treaties plus non-treaty developments (subsequent practice or customary law); and (iii) [most broadly, where] all the rules and principles that regulate a certain problem area are collected together so as to express a 'special regime'. Expressions such as 'law of the sea', 'humanitarian law', 'human rights law', 'environmental law' and 'trade law', etc give expression to some such regimes. For interpretative purposes, such regimes may often be considered in their entirety.
These definitions of 'special regimes' contain differing assumptions, some of which are mirrored in other literature on 'regimes', including from IR scholarship. These differing assumptions deserve greater attention, affecting as they do the utility of the definitions for the current study of regime interaction.
There are four principal sets of assumptions that diverge in the definitions of regimes offered in the ILC and other literature. These relate to the actors, institutions, 'stages' of legal development and, finally, the possibility of systems-based or emergent practices within regimes. In short, Young 6 they are assumptions about the 'who', 'what', 'when' and 'why' inherent in 'regimes'. Articulating the differences in these four sets of assumptions provides for a better understanding of the conceptions of 'regimes' and the associated study of regime interaction in this volume.
The first set of assumptions relate to the actors that make up regimes. Two of the ILC's three conceptions of 'special regimes' rest on international norms and practices propagated by a single set of actors -namely, states. According to a positivist conception, some regimes apply to all states (for example, when treaties enjoy universal membership) while other regimes apply only to some (most commonly, because only a group of states have consented to be bound by a treaty). State participation and consent is the same foundation underpinning the notion of 'regimes' developed in international relations scholarship (notwithstanding the marked deviations in some of the other fundamentals of the discipline founded by Morgenthau as compared to international law). In contrast, states are not the sole influences operating in the ILC Study Group's third conception of 'special regimes'. This is akin to scholarship on private law and transnational arrangements, which consider the operation of 'private regimes' that coalesce around issues of functional specialisation but that are not necessarily motivated by -and may even exclude -the interests of states.
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'Regimes' in IR scholarship have been defined as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. 20 Given the background realist assumptions of the IR discipline, it is fair to imply that it is the intentions of states that are paramount in establishing regimes, as defined. 21 The idea of 'regimes' in IR literature has spawned a massive literature that has sought to study discrete groups 19 
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of norms under the rubric of 'regime theory' 22 -a normative turn that preceded current constructivist accounts. 23 'Regime theory' has tended to analyse single regimes rather than regime interaction, although there is a growing body of work on 'regime complexes'. 24 The IR definition of 'regime' has also been influential in international law scholarship. 25 Other conceptions of 'regimes' seek to include actors besides states within the term. The broadest of the ILC Study Group's three notions of 'special regimes' emphasises a body of 'functional specialization or teleological orientation', such as environmental law or trade law. 26 This may imply that the ideals, objectives and activities of other actors, besides states, are formative to the regimes. If so, it requires one to consider the influence of 'professional mindsets' on regime interaction. 27 Technical experts, non-governmental organisations, secretariat staff, tribunal members, and other actors become part of the definition of regimes and thus essential to a study of regime interaction.
Such awareness underpins a sociological understanding of fragmentation -and the Weberian idea of functional specialisation -and informs the approach of scholars who acknowledge that the conflict between regimes in international law reflect wider societal conflicts. The associated studies of 'discursive networks' seek to demonstrate certain biases and preferences within regimes that preclude efforts at harmony or conflict resolution.
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Fields of functional specialisation also underlie the conception of 22 See Krasner, International Regimes. The term 'regime' has other connotations within the wider political science literature, where it is sometimes used to denote governments or other systems of power (as reflected in the popular genteelism 'regime change'). 23 
'regulatory regimes' governing particular activities, such as taxation or finance arrangements. 29 Moreover, an awareness of the role of an expanded set of actors is central to IR scholarship on 'epistemic communities'.
30
That 'regimes' are not dependent on states is fundamental to the study of global, private legal relations identified as 'transnational regimes'. 31 The problem of regime interaction is especially challenging in this context: the 'private' legal regimes, though not based on the interests of states as articulated in international fora, still seek a global, unifying reach. Like regimes in international law, transnational regimes such as lex digitalis are motivated by sectoral differentiation, but they are removed from any state-based political articulation. The resulting legal pluralism presents known and emerging challenges for governance, 32 especially in the context of interacting regimes. Techniques from private international law are being offered in both the transnational and international context in an increasingly fluid and dynamic way.
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The second set of assumptions inherent in the differing conceptions of 'regimes' relates to institutions. The role of international organisations is not apparent in any of the ILC's conceptions of 'special regimes', although arguably the two broader conceptions implicitly rely on some kind of institutional background to the relevant rules and principles. For example, intergovernmental rules relating to a geographical area have historically depended on administrative bodies. 34 The normative influence of such institutions on matters of international governance has received renewed attention in legal and interdisciplinary literature, 35 governance', as well as fragmentation. 36 Examples of institutional interplay, particularly in the environmental sphere, enhance understanding of particular legal arrangements. 37 Regimes may well include or depend upon an 'institutionalized system of dealing with a particular field of behaviour'. 38 A combination of approaches would thus adopt a definition of regimes that includes institutions. Accordingly, regimes are sets of norms, decision-making procedures and organisations coalescing around functional issue-areas. 39 The third set of assumptions that deviate as between different regime definitions relate to what are loosely described here as 'stages' of legal development and application. International law is constantly made, implemented and enforced. These 'stages' are not always temporally sequenced; especially as law may be 'made' before it is formally negotiated or implemented. 40 Yet the literature on fragmentation has so far concentrated mainly on the resolution of conflicting norms, 41 which occurs after laws are negotiated or have otherwise become custom. Such a focus is apparent in the first two of the ILC Study Group's conceptions of 'special regimes'. Yet its broadest conception allows for a more dynamic understanding of © in this web service Cambridge University Press
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legal processes, because a field of functional specialisation in its entirety, such as trade law, is subject to ongoing normative development and change, especially with respect to multilateral negotiations but also due to state practice.
The IR regime definitions -with their emphasis on the convergence of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures -also seem to accommodate different stages of legal development, although sometimes at the risk of ignoring issues of juris-generative power. Specialised legal knowledge, however well-organised, is not the same as a regime. A flexibility of understanding of stages of legal development within regimes must combine, in studies of regime interaction, a legal sense for the crossfertilisation between relevant stages. 42 The fourth set of assumptions inherent within the current definitions of regimes relate to the possibility of systems-based or emergent practices. One of the dangers of discussions about 'regimes' is that they risk essentialising certain bodies of laws and principles. When a broad definition is used, such as the ILC Study Group's third conception, the danger is particularly great, because the multiplicious and often conflicting perspectives and preferences within professional circles may be reduced to a single set of ideas. 43 In addition, notions of 'regimes' obscure the generality of international law and may distort our understanding about the overall international legal system. 44 It makes the use of metaphors in the regime literature -such as 'ships', 'islands', 'arenas' and 'platforms' -seem rather imprudent.
Yet notwithstanding the problems with reification of regimes, it remains the case that there is a certain 'stickiness' within particular bodies of laws, institutions and professional specialisations, especially those that are constituted by specialist courts and tribunals. 45 The unwieldy and intransigent nature of regimes is often intentional, and may reflect a wish by powerful states to protect their dominance. 46 Moreover, functional
